Craig's interpolation theorem [Craig, 1957] is an important theorem known for propositional logic and first-order logic. It says that if a logical formula β logically follows from a formula α, then there is a formula γ, including only symbols that appear in both α, β, such that β logically follows from γ and γ logically follows from α. Such theorems are important and useful for understanding those logics in which they hold as well as for speeding up reasoning with theories in those logics. In this paper we present interpolation theorems in this spirit for three nonmonotonic systems: circumscription, default logic and logic programs with the stable models semantics (a.k.a. answer set semantics). These results give us better understanding of those logics, especially in contrast to their nonmonotonic characteristics. They suggest that some monotonicity principle holds despite the failure of classic monotonicity for these logics. Also, they sometimes allow us to use methods for the decomposition of reasoning for these systems, possibly increasing their applicability and tractability. Finally, they allow us to build structured representations that use those logics.
Introduction
Craig's interpolation theorem [Craig, 1957] is an important theorem known for propositional logic and first-order logic (FOL) . It says that if α, β are two logical formulae and α ⊢ β, then there is a formula γ ∈ L(α) ∩ L(β) such that α ⊢ γ and γ ⊢ β ("⊢" is the classical logical deduction relation; L(α) is the language of α (the set of formulae built with the nonlogical symbols of α, L(α))). Such interpolation theorems allow us to break inference into pieces associated with sublanguages of the language of that theory [McIlraith and Amir, 2001] , for those formal systems in which they hold. In AI, these properties have been used to speed up inference for constraint satisfaction systems (CSPs), propositional logic and FOL (e.g., [Dechter and Pearl, 1988 , Darwiche, 1998 , McIlraith and Amir, 2001 , Dechter and Rish, 1994 , Darwiche, 1997 , Amir and McIlraith, 2000 , Dechter, 1999 and to build structured representations [Darwiche, 1998 , Amir, 2000 , Darwiche, 1997 In this paper we present interpolation theorems for three nonmonotonic systems:
circumscription [McCarthy, 1980] , default logic [Reiter, 1980] and logic programs with the Answer Set semantics [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991, Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988] .
In the nonmonotonic setup there are several interpolation theorems for each system, with different conditions for applicability and different form of interpolation. This stands in contrast to classical logic, where Craig's interpolation theorem always holds.
Our theorems allow us to use methods for the decomposition of reasoning (a-la [Amir and McIlraith, 2000, McIlraith and Amir, 2001 ]) under some circumstances for these systems, possibly increasing their applicability and tractability for structured theories. We list the main theorems that we show in this paper below, omitting some of their conditions for simplicity.
For circumscription we show that, under some conditions, Circ[α; P ; Q] |= β iff there is some set of formulae γ ⊆ L(α) ∩ L(β) such that α |= γ and Circ[γ; P ; Q] |= β. For example, to answer Circ[BlockW ; block; L(BlockW )] |= on(A, B), we can compute this formula γ ∈ L({block, on, A, B}) from BlockW without applying circumscription, and then solve Circ[γ; block; L(BlockW )] |= on(A, B) (where γ may be significantly smaller than BlockW ).
For default logic, letting α |∼ D β mean that every extension of α, D entails β (cautious entailment), we show that, under some conditions, if α |∼ D β, then there is a formula γ ∈ L(α ∪ D) ∩ L(β) such that α |∼ D γ and γ |∼ D β. For logic programs we show that if P 1 , P 2 are two logic programs and ϕ ∈ L(P 2 ) such that P 1 ∪P 2 |∼ b ϕ, then there is γ ∈ L(P 1 ) ∩ L(P 2 ) such that P 1 |∼ b γ and P 2 ∪ γ |∼ b ϕ (here |∼ b is the brave entailment for logic programs). This paper focuses on the form of the interpolation theorems that hold for those nonmonotonic logics. We do not address the possible application of these results to the problem of automated reasoning with those logics. Nonetheless, we mention that direct application of those results is possible along the lines already explored for propositional logic and FOL in [Amir and McIlraith, 2000, McIlraith and Amir, 2001] .
No interpolation theorems were shown for nonmonotonic reasoning systems before this paper. Nonetheless, some of our theorems for default logic and logic programs are close to the splitting theorems of Turner, 1994, Turner, 1996] , which have already been used to decompose reasoning for those logics. The main difference between our theorems and those splitting theorems is that the latter change some of the defaults/rules involved to provide the corresponding entailment. Also, they do not talk about an interpolant γ, but rather discuss combining extensions.
Since its debut, the nonmonotonic reasoning line of work has expanded and several textbooks now exist that give a fair view of nonmonotonic reasoning and its uses (e.g., [Gabbay et al., 1993] ). The reader is referred to those books for background and further details.
Logical Preliminaries
In this paper, we use the notion of logical theory for every set of axioms in FOL or propositional logic, regardless of whether the set of axioms is deductively closed or not. We use L(A) to denote the signature of A, i.e., the set of nonlogical symbols. L(A) denotes the language of A, i.e., the set of formulae built with L(A). Cn(A) is the set of logical consequences of A (i.e., those formulae that are valid consequences of A in FOL). For a first-order structure, M , in L, we write U (M ) for the universe of elements of M . For every symbol, s, in L, we write s M for the interpretation of s in M .
Finally, we note Craig's Interpolation Theorem.
Theorem 2.1 ([Craig, 1957])
Let α, β be sentences such that α ⊢ β. Then there is a formula γ involving only nonlogical symbols common to both α and β, such that α ⊢ γ and γ ⊢ β.
Circumscription

McCarthy's Circumscription: Overview
McCarthy's circumscription [McCarthy, 1980 , McCarthy, 1986 ] is a nonmonotonic reasoning system in which inference from a set of axioms, A, is performed by minimizing the extent of some predicate symbols − → P , while allowing some other nonlogical symbols, − → Z to vary.
Formally, McCarthy's circumscription formula
says that in the theory A, with parameter relations and function vectors (sequence of symbols) P, Z, P is a minimal element such that A(P, Z) is still consistent, when we are allowed to vary Z in order to allow P to become smaller.
Take for example the following simple theory:
Then, the circumscription of block in T , varying nothing, is
Roughly, this means that block is a minimal predicate satisfying T . Computing circumscription is discussed in length in [Lifschitz, 1993] and others, and we do not expand on it here. Using known techniques we can conclude
This means that there are no other blocks in the world other than those mentioned in the original theory T .
We give the preferential semantics for circumscription that was given by [Lifschitz, 1985 , McCarthy, 1986 , Etherington, 1986 in the following definition.
Definition 3.1 ( [Lifschitz, 1985] ) For any two models M and N of a theory T we write M ≤ P,Z N if the models M, N differ only in how they interpret predicates from P and Z and if the extension of every predicate from P in M is a subset of its extension in N . We write M < P,Z N if for at least one predicate in P the extension in M is a strict subset of its extension in N .
We say that a model M of T is ≤ P,Z -minimal if there is no model N such that N < P,Z M . This theorem allows us to extend the definition of circumscription to set of infinite number of sentences. In those cases, Circ[T ; P ; Z] is defined as the set of sentences that hold in all the ≤ P,Z -minimal models of T . Theorem 3.2 implies that this extended definition is equivalent to the syntactic characterization of the original definition (equation (1)) if T is a finite set of sentences. In the rest of this paper, we refer to this extended definition of circumscription, if T is an infinite set of FOL sentences (we will note those cases when we encounter them).
Circumscription satisfied Left Logical Equivalence (LLE):
. It also satisfies Right Weakening (RW): Circ[T ; P ; Z] |= ϕ and ϕ ⇒ ψ implies that Circ[T ; P ; Z] |= ψ).
Model Theory
f : M → N is an elementary embedding if f is an injective (one-to-one) homomorphism from M to N and for every ϕ( − → x ) ∈ L and vector − → a = a 1 , ..., a n of elements from U (M ) (i.e., a 1 , .., a n ∈ U (M )),
For FOL signatures L ⊆ L + , and for N an L + -structure, we say that N ↾ L is the reduct of N to L, the L-structure with the same universe of elements as N , and the same interpretation as N for those symbols from L + that are in L (there is no interpretation for symbols not in L). For A theory T in a language of L + , let Cn L (T ) be the set of all consequences of T in the language of L.
The following theorem is a model-theoretic property that is analogous to Craig's interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1). [Hodges, 1997] 
Theorem 3.4 (See
p.148) Let L, L + be FOL signatures with L ⊆ L + and T a theory in the lan- guage of L + . Let M be an L-structure. Then, M |= Cn L (T ) if and only if for some model N of T , M N ↾ L (M is an elementary substructure of the reduct of N to L).
Interpolation in Circumscription
In this section we present two interpolation theorems for circumscription. Those theorems hold for both FOL and propositional logic. Roughly speaking, the first (Theorem 3.8) says that if α nonmonotonically entails β (here this means Circ[α; P ; Q] |= β), then there is γ ⊆ L(α) ∩ L(β ∪ P ) such that α classically entails γ (α |= γ) and γ nonmonotonically entails β (Circ[γ; P ; Q] |= β). In the FOL case this γ can be an infinite set of sentences, and we use the extended definition of Circumscription for infinite sets of axioms for this statement.
The second theorem (Theorem 3.11) is similar to the first, with two main differences. First, it requires that L(α) ⊆ (P ∪ Q). Second, it guarantees that γ as above (and some other restrictions) exists iff α nonmonotonically entails β. This is in contrast to the first theorem that guarantees only that if part. The actual technical details are more fine than those rough statements, so the reader should refer to the actual theorem statements.
In addition to these two theorems, we present another theorem that addresses the case of reasoning from the union of theories (Theorem 3.10). Before we state and prove those theorems, we prove several useful lemmas.
Our first lemma says that if we are given two theories T 1 , T 2 , and we know the set of sentences that follow from T 2 in the intersection of their languages, then every model of this set of sentences together with T 1 can be extended to a model of
Lemma 3.5 Let T 1 , T 2 be two theories, with signatures in L 1 , L 2 , respectively. Let γ be a set of sentences logically equivalent to
We use Craig's interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1) to show this is indeed the case.
First notice that
Finally, the conditions of Theorem 3.
Our second lemma says that every
Lemma 3.6 Let T be a theory and
The following theorem is central to the rest of our results in this section. It says that when we circumscribe P, Q in T 1 ∪ T 2 we can replace T 2 by its consequences in L(T 1 ), for some purposes and under some assumptions.
Theorem 3.7 Let T 1 , T 2 be two theories and P, Q two vectors of symbols from
PROOF
We show that for every model of
Thus, M is a ≤ P,Q -minimal model of T 1 ∪ γ. To see this, assume otherwise. Then, there is a model M ′ for the signa-
′′ such that the interpretation of all the symbols in L(T 1 ) is exactly the same as that of M ′ and such that the interpretation of all symbols in
Theorem 3.8 (Interpolation for Circumscription 1) Let
T be a theory, P, Q vectors of symbols, and ϕ a formula.
Furthermore, this γ can be logically equivalent to the con
- sequences of T in L(T ) ∩ L(ϕ ∪ P ).
PROOF
We use Theorem 3.7 to find this γ. For T, ϕ as in the statement of the theorem we define T 1 , T 2 as follows. We choose T 1 such that ϕ ∈ L(T 1 ) and P ⊆ L(T 1 ): Let T 1 = {ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ} ∪ τ 1 for τ 1 a set of tautologies such that L(τ 1 ) = P . We choose T 2 such that it includes T and has a rich enough vocabulary so that P,
In particular, Circ[γ; P ; Q] |= ϕ, and this γ satisfies our current theorem.
This theorem does not hold if we require
For example, take ϕ = Q, T = {¬P ⇒ Q}, where P, Q are propositional symbols. Circ[T ; P ; Q] |= ϕ. However, every logical consequence of T in L(ϕ) is a tautology. Thus, if the theorem was correct with our changed requirement, γ would be equivalent to ∅ and Circ[γ; P ; Q] |= ϕ.
Theorem 3.9 Let T 1 , T 2 be two theories, P, Q two vectors of symbols from
PROOF
We show that every model of
From Theorem 3.7 and Theorem 3.9 we get the following theorem.
Theorem 3.10 (Interpolation Between Theories) Let
T 1 , T 2 be two theories, P, Q vectors of symbols in L(T 1 ) ∪ L(T 2 ) such that P ⊆ L(T 1 ) and P ∪ Q ⊃ L(T 2 ). Let γ be a set of sentences logically equivalent to Cn L(T1)∩L(T2) (T 2 ). Then, for every ϕ ∈ L(T 1 ), Circ[T 1 ∪ γ; P ; Q] |= ϕ ⇐⇒ Circ[T 1 ∪ T 2 ; P ; Q] |= ϕ
Theorem 3.11 (Interpolation for Circumscription 2)
Let T be a theory, P, Q vectors of symbols such that
Furthermore, this γ can be logically equivalent to the con-
. Theorem 3.10 guarantees that γ from that theorem satisfies Circ[γ;
The theorems we presented are for parallel circumscription, where we minimize all the minimized predicates in parallel without priorities. The case of prioritized circumscription is outside the scope of this paper.
Default Logic
In this section we present interpolation theorems for propositional default logic. We also assume that the signature of our propositional default theories is finite (this also implies that our theories are finite).
Reiter's Default Logic: Overview
In Reiter's default logic [Reiter, 1980] one has a set of facts W (in either propositional or FOL) and a set of defaults D (in a corresponding language). Defaults in D are of the form α:β1,...,βn δ with the intuition that if α is proved, and β 1 , ..., β n are consistent (throughout the proof), then δ is proved. α is called the prerequisite, pre(d) = {α}; β 1 , ..., β n are the justifications, just(d) = {β 1 , ..., β n } and δ is the consequent, cons(d) = {δ}. We use similar notation for sets of defaults (e.g., cons(D) = d∈D cons(d)). Notice that the justifications are checked for consistency one at a time (and not conjoined).
Take, for example, the following default theory T = W, D :
Intuitively, this theory says that birds normally fly and that T weety is a bird.
An extension of W, D is a set of sentences E that satisfies W , follows the defaults in D, and is minimal. More formally, E is an extension if it is minimal (as a set) such that Γ(E) = E, where we define Γ(S 0 ) to be S, a minimal set of sentences such that
W ⊆ S; S = Cn(S).
For all
α:β1,...,βn δ ∈ D if α ∈ S and ∀i ¬β i / ∈ S 0 , then δ ∈ S.
The following theorem provides an equivalent definition that was shown in [Marek and Truszczyński, 1993 , Risch and Schwind, 1994 , Baader and Hollunder, 1995 . A set of defaults, D is grounded in a set of formulae
Theorem 4.1 (Extensions in Terms of Generating Defaults) A set of formulae E is an extension of a default theory
Every minimal set of defaults D ′ ⊆ D as mentioned in this theorem is said to be a set of generating defaults.
Normal defaults are defaults of the form α:β β . These defaults are interesting because they are fairly intuitive in nature (if we proved α then β is proved unless previously proved inconsistent). We say that a default theory is normal, if all of its defaults are normal.
We define W |∼ D ϕ as cautious entailment sanctioned by the defaults in D, i.e., ϕ follows from every extension of W, D . We define W |∼ b D ϕ as brave entailment sanctioned by the defaults in D, i.e., ϕ follows from at least one extension of W, D .
Interpolation in Default Logic
In this section we present several flavors of interpolation theorems, most of which are stated for cautious entailment.
Theorem 4.2 (Interpolation for Cautious DL 1) Let T = W, D be a propositional default theory and ϕ a propositional formula. If
and all the following hold:
. Let E be the set of extensions of W, D and E ′ the set of extensions of γ 1 , D . We show that every extension E ′ ∈ E ′ has an extension E ∈ E such that Cn(E ′ ∪ W ) = Cn(E). This will show that γ 1 is as needed.
because otherwise we can take a logically equivalent extension whose sentences are in L (D) . We show that E 0 satisfies the conditions for extensions of W, D :
The first condition holds by definition of E 0 . The second condition holds because every default that is consistent with E 0 is also consistent with E ′ and vice versa. We detail the second condition below.
For the first direction (every default that is consistent with E 0 is also consistent with E ′ ), let
Using the deduction theorem for propositional logic we get W |= E ′ ⇒ α (taking E ′ here to be a finite set of sentences that is logically equivalent to E ′ in L(D) (there is such a finite set because we assume that L (D) is finite) ). Using Craig's interpolation theorem for propositional logic, there is γ ∈ L(W ) ∩ L(E ′ ⇒ α) such that W |= γ and γ |= E ′ ⇒ α. However, this means that γ 1 |= γ, by the way we chose γ 1 . Thus
The case is similar for δ: if δ ∈ E 0 then δ ∈ E ′ by the same argument as given above for
The opposite direction (every default that is consistent with E ′ is also consistent with E 0 ) is similar to the first one.
Thus, E 0 satisfies those two conditions. However, it is possible that E 0 is not a minimal such set of formulae. If so, Theorem 4.1 implies that there is a strict subset of the generating defaults of E 0 that generate a different extension. However, we can apply this new set of defaults to generate an extension that is smaller than E ′ , contradicting the fact that E ′ is an extension of γ 1 , D . Now, if ϕ logically follows in all the extensions of W, D then it must also follow from every extension of γ 1 , D together with W . Let Λ = E 1 ∨ ... ∨ E n , for E 1 , ..., E n the (finite) set of (logically non-equivalent) extensions of W, D (we have a finite set of those because L(W )∪L(D) is finite). Then, Λ |= ϕ. Take γ 2 ∈ L(Λ) ∩ L(ϕ) such that Λ |= γ 2 and γ 2 |= ϕ, as guaranteed by Craig's interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1). These γ 1 , γ 2 are those promised by the current theorem: (D) , and all the following hold:
The proof is similar to the one for Theorem 4.2. It is interesting to note that we do not get stronger interpolation theorems for prerequisite-free normal default theories. [Imielinski, 1987] provided a modular translation of normal default theories with no prerequisites into circumscription, but Theorem 3.8 does not lead to better results. In particular, the counter example that we presented after that theorem can be massaged to apply here too.
Theorem 4.5 (Interpolation Between Default Extensions)
be the set of generating defaults of E that belong to D 1 . Notice that these defaults are grounded in W 1 because there is no information that may have come from applying the rest of the generating defaults in E (we required that cons (D 2 
) be the conjunction of the sentences in that language that follow from E 1 . Let D ′ 2 ⊆ D 2 be the set of generating defaults of E that belong to D 2 . Notice that these defaults are grounded in W 2 ∪ γ because there is no information that D ′ 1 may contribute that is not already in γ (we required that cons (D 2 
. Let E 2 be the extension of W 2 ∪ γ, D 2 defined with the generating defaults in D ′ 2 . Now, E 1 ∪ E 2 ≡ E, and γ is the set of sentences that follow from E 1 in L(E 1 ) ∩ L(E 2 ∪ ϕ). E 2 |= ϕ because of Craig's interpolation theorem (Theorem 2.1) for propositional logic: E 1 ∪ E 2 |= ϕ implies that E 1 |= E 2 ⇒ ϕ, and Craig's interpolation theorem guarantees the existence of γ
It is interesting to notice that the reverse direction of this theorem does not hold. For example, if we have two extensions E 1 , E 2 as in the theorem statement, it is possible that E 1 uses a default with justification β, but W 2 |= ¬β. Strengthening the condition of the theorem, i.e., demanding 
Further strengthening the conditions of the theorem gives the following: Theorem 4.6 (Reverse Direction of Theorem 4.5)
and an extension E 2 of W 2 ∪ {γ}, D 2 such that E 2 |= ϕ.
PROOF
Let E 1 , E 2 be as in the statement of the theorem. Let π 1 , π 2 be the sets of defaults applied in E 1 , E 2 , respectively. Let E = Cn(E 1 ∪ E 2 ), and let π = π 1 ∪ π 2 . We show that E is an extension of
∈ π, α and γ d hold because they hold in one of
here as finite sets of formulae because they are in propositional logic).
. Using Craig's interpolation theorem we get that γ from the theorem's statement satisfies {γ} ∪ {β i } |= ¬E 2 . Consequently,
. Since E 1 |= E 2 ⇒ ¬β i , we get from Craig's interpolation theorem that γ |= E 2 ⇒ ¬β i . However, γ ∈ E 2 by the definition of E 2 . Thus, E 2 |= ¬β, contradicting the fact that d is a default applied in E 2 .
In conclusion, ¬β / ∈ E. Thus, all the defaults in π are applied in E. It is also simple to see that no other default is applied in E.
If there is a default d = α:β1,...,βn γ d ∈ D 1 that should apply in E but is not in π, then its preconditions and justifications hold in E. However, this means that α follows from E 1 ∪ E 2 , and E 2 = Cn(cons(π 2 ) ∪ W 2 ∪ {γ}). Similar to the argument above we get that E 1 |= α. Similarly, we get that if β i / ∈ E then E 1 |= ¬β i , implying that d should have applied in E 1 , contradicting the fact that E 1 is an extension of
If there is a default d = α:β1,...,βn γ d ∈ D 2 that should apply in E but is not in π, then its preconditions and justifications hold in E. A similar argument to the one above shows that it should have applied in E 2 too, contradicting the fact that E 2 is an extension.
Minimality of E follows from that of E 1 , E 2 . Thus, E is an extension of Better interpolation theorems may hold (e.g., theorems that do not depend on cons (D 2 ), pre(D 1 ), etc., and pro-
Corollary 4.7 (Interpolation for Brave DL)
. These are outside the scope of this paper.
Finally, Corollary 4.7 and Theorem 4.5 are similar to the splitting theorem of [Turner, 1996] , which is provided for default theories with W = ∅ (there is a modular translation that converts every default theory to one with W = ∅). We briefly review this result. A splitting set for a set of defaults 
Logic Programs
In this section we provide interpolation theorems for logic programs with the stable models semantics. We use the fact the logic programs are a special case of default logic, and the results are straightforward.
An extended disjunctive logic program [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1988 , Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1990 , Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991 , Przymusiński, 1991 ] is a set of rules. Each rule, r, is written as an expression of the form A program P is positive if none of its rules includes negated subgoals. A set of literals, X, is closed under a positive program, P , if, for every rule r ∈ P such that pos(r) ⊆ X, head(r) ∩ X = ∅. A set of literals is logically closed if it consistent or contains all literals. An answer set for a positive program, P is a minimal set of literals that is both closed under P and logically closed.
For an arbitrary logic program, P , and a set of literals, X, we say that X is an answer set for a program P if X is an answer set for P X , where P X is defined to include a rule r ′ iff neg(r ′ ) = ∅ and there is r ∈ P such that head(r ′ ) = head(r), pos(r ′ ) = pos(r), and neg(r) ∩ X = ∅.
Logic programs with answer-set semantics were shown equivalent to default logic in several ways. For normal rules (rules of the form A ← B 1 , ..., B m , not C 1 , ..., not C n , where A, B 1 , ..., B m , C 1 , ..., C n are atoms (i.e., no disjunction or classic negation is allowed)), [Gelfond and Lifschitz, 1991] translated every normal rule of the form
Under this mapping, the stable models of a logic program coincide with the extensions of the corresponding default theory (Facts in the logic program are translated to facts in the default theory, while rules are translated to defaults).
[ Sakama and Inoue, 1993] showed that disjunctive logic programs (no classic negation) with the stable model semantics can be translated to prerequisite-free default theories as follows:
For each atom A appearing in P , we get the default :¬A ¬A Each stable model of P is the set of atoms in some extension of D P , and the set of atoms in an extension of D P is a stable model of P (notice that, in general, an extension of D P can include sentences that are not atoms and are not subsumed by atoms in that extension). [Sakama and Inoue, 1993] provide a similar translation to extended disjunctive logic programs by first translating those into disjunctive logic programs (a literal ¬A is translated to a new symbol, A ′ ), showing that a similar property holds for this class of programs.
We define P |∼ ϕ as cautious entailment sanctioned from the logic program P , i.e., ϕ follows from stable model of P . We define P |∼ b ϕ as brave entailment sanctioned from the logic program P , i.e., ϕ follows from at least one stable model of P .
From the last translation above we get the following interpolation theorems.
Theorem 5.1 (Interpolation for Stable Models (Cautious)) Let P be a logic program and let ϕ be a formula such that P |∼ ϕ. Then, there is a formula γ ∈ L(P ) ∩ L(ϕ) such that P |∼ γ and γ |= ϕ.
PROOF
Follows immediately from Theorem 4.2 with γ 2 over there corresponding to our needed γ.
Theorem 5.2 (Interpolation for Stable Models (Brave))
Let P 1 , P 2 be logic programs such that head(P 2 ) ∩ body(P 1 ) = ∅. Let ϕ ∈ L(P 2 ) be a formula such that P 1 ∪P 2 |∼ b ϕ. Then, there is a formula γ ∈ L(P 1 )∩L(P 2 ) such that P 1 |∼ b γ and γ ∪ P 2 |∼ b ϕ.
PROOF
Follows directly from the reduction into default logic and Corollary 4.7.
The last theorem is similar to the splitting theorem of [Lifschitz and Turner, 1994] . This theorem finds an answer set X of the bottom (P 1 ) and converts P 2 using this X into a program P ′ 2 . Then, an answer set Y for P ′ 2 completes the answer set for P 1 ∪ P 2 if X ∪ Y is consistent. In contrast, our theorem does not change P 2 , but it is somewhat weaker, in that it does only provides a necessary condition for P 1 ∪ P 2 |∼ b ϕ (this is the typical form of an interpolation theorem).
Summary
We presented interpolation theorems that are applicable to the nonmonotonic systems of circumscription, default logic and Answer Set Programming (a.k.a. Stable Models Semantics). These results are somewhat surprising and revealing in that they show particular structure for the nonmonotonic entailments associated with the different systems. They promise to help in reasoning with larger systems that are based on these nonmonotonic systems.
Several questions remain open. First, γ promised by our theorems is not always finite (in the FOL case). This is in contrast to classical FOL, where the interpolant is always of finite length. What conditions guarantee that it is finite in our setup? We conjecture that this will require the partial order involved in the circumscription to be smooth. Second, are there better interpolation theorems for the prioritized case of those systems? Also, what is the shape of the interpolation theorems specific for prerequisite-free seminormal defaults? Further, our results for default logic and logic programs are propositional. How do they extend to the FOL case?
Finally, the theorems for default logic and Logic Programming promise that α |∼ D β implies the existence of γ such that α |∼ D γ and γ |∼ D β. However, we do not know that the other direction holds, i.e., that the existence of γ such that α |∼ D γ and γ |∼ D β implies that α |∼ D β. Can we do better than Theorem 4.6 for different cases?
